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Introduction: Relations and the Historiography of 
Medieval Philosophy 
 
This is the first special issue of the British Journal of the History of Philosophy to be devoted 
to the thought of the Middle Ages. Its topic is relations. The articles have been chosen to give 
an idea of the range of the broadly medieval traditions – in Greek and Arabic, as well as 
Latin, from the eighth until the seventeenth century. Most of the contributions concern the 
metaphysics of relations, but the logic of arguments involving relations is also considered, as 
well how ideas about relations are used to address other philosophical or theological issues. 
The main purpose of this introduction is to sketch out the wider background into which each 
of the following specialized discussions fits, looking in turn at the general doctrinal 
background, the methodological background and then at the more particular contexts of each 
of the papers. It concludes with some suggestions about the direction and methods of future 
research. 
For a fuller survey of the area, readers can turn to a number of general studies written 
over the last fifty years. In the 1960s, Julius Weinberg set out briefly the whole history of 
discussions about relations, concentrating especially on ‘medieval views’.1 Mark Henninger’s 
Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (1989) is both narrower, as the title makes clear, 
and far more detailed, setting out with analytical clarity the complex theories of Aquinas, 
Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton, Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, William of Ockham 
and Peter Aureoli. Henninger is criticized for his restricted range by Rolf Schönberger, whose 
monograph on relations in Buridan contains a book-length survey of the earlier Latin 
tradition, starting with Aquinas and covering many writers not examined by Henninger, 
including Siger of Brabant, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, Jacob of Viterbo, Peter 
John Olivi, John of Jandun and others (63-236). Two short surveys provide an even greater 
range, but with much less detail: Burkhard Mojsisch in the Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie and Laurent Cesalli in the Dictionnaire du Moyen Âge. The encyclopedia entry, 
however, which is most likely to provide Anglophone readers with an introduction to the 
subject is Jeffrey Brower’s contribution (‘Medieval Theories of Relations’) to the online 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an extended essay that takes a very different approach 
to Mojsisch and Cesalli, going light on the details of different thinkers and their precise 
theories in order to give a sophisticated exposition, in the terms of contemporary philosophy, 
of what he considers the main theoretical options developed by the ‘medievals’ (twelfth to 
early fourteenth-century Latin thinkers). More detail can be found in the 2013 issue of 
Quaestio, edited by Pasquale Porro and Vincent Carraud, devoted to ‘The Ontology of 
Relation’, which contains specialized studies of Alhazen and Avicenna, Scotus, Auriol, 
Dietrich of Freiberg, Burley and Ockham. Finally, all but two of the articles printed here are 
based on papers given at the twentieth  European Symposium of Medieval Logic and 
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Semantics in June 2014, on ‘Medieval Theories of Relations’, but they represent only a small 
selection from over thirty contributions. The papers ranged widely over – and beyond – the 
subject. A summary of them has been published, and most of them will in due course be 
collected into a book.
2
 
 
The doctrinal background 
Aristotle is the starting point for almost all medieval discussion of relations. Yet, 
although his texts on it – especially Categories Chapter 7, available from early on in all the 
traditions, Metaphysics V, 15 and Physics V,2 (225b11-13)– were relentlessly glossed, the 
question was shaped less by them in particular than by Aristotle’s more general metaphysical 
framework. In the specific texts themselves, Aristotle talks, not about relations (such as being 
greater than, or being the father of), but about things taken under the description of being 
related (such as a number, which is a quantity, greater than another, or a man, who is his 
son’s father).3 The ontology of the Categories, however, divided all things into substances – 
particular members of natural kinds, such as a human, a horse or a flower – and their 
accidents, particular properties of a substance which it can gain and lose without ceasing to 
be the sort of substance it is – Socrates’s whiteness and his being-six-foot-tall, for example. 
Particular accidents cannot exist independently, and each is considered to belong to just one 
particular substance. (According to many medieval interpreters of Aristotle, there are also 
universal substances and accidents. Some disagreed, but, in any case, discussion about 
relations focused on particulars.)  
On this Aristotelian scheme a relation, such as Socrates’s being taller than Plato, or 
Abelard’s being the father of Astrolabe, is a particular accident. As such, it was usually 
accepted that it belongs to just one substance: ‘being taller than Plato’ is an accident of 
Socrates, not of Plato, although, unlike Socrates’s whiteness or being-six-foot-tall, it looks 
towards or regards something else – Plato. According to the terminology which became 
standard in the universities of later medieval Latin Europe, Socrates is the ‘subject’ of a 
(particular) relation of being taller than, and Plato is the ‘term’ of this relation, which has as 
its ‘foundation’ Socrates’s accident, in the Aristotelian category of quantity, of being-six-
foot-tall. If Socrates is taller than Plato, then Plato will be shorter than Socrates, and so there 
will also be a particular relation of being shorter than Socrates in Plato as its subject and with 
his being-five-foot tall as its foundation. 
Medieval discussion of relations concerned especially their ontological status within 
this framework. There seems to be good reason to query whether relations are items in their 
own right, and Aristotle himself describes them as being even less substances or things than 
any other of the categories (Metaphysics XIV.1, 1088a23, 30). For Socrates to be taller than 
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Plato, is any further entity needed beyond Socrates’s being-six-foot-tall and Plato’s being-
five-foot-tall? Medieval philosophers saw the point clearly. Most of them held, none the less, 
that such further entities are needed, but found various ways to qualify the extent to which 
they are separate beings; a few ruled them out altogether.  
Although Aristotle provided the framework, religious dogma also helped to mould 
medieval treatment of relations. The influence of Christianity, in particular, is especially 
evident. Not only did Christians, like Muslims and Jews, have to consider the relation 
between an immutable God and his changeable creatures; they also had to explain how there 
can be relations (of fatherhood, sonship and being spirated) in God himself. Aristotle’s idea 
(Categories 7b22 – 8a12) that there are one-sided relations between, for instance, knowledge 
and the knowable was developed into the theory that, whereas creatures have real relations to 
God, God is related to them only by reason. The fact of there being relations in God entailed 
a departure from Aristotle, because these relations could not be accidents, since there are no 
accidents in God. Moreover, since it was heretical to hold that Trinitarian relations are merely 
ways of conceiving God, the doctrine of the Trinity – as Suarez, looking back at the whole 
tradition, put it –  gave ‘great probability’ to the position that there are real relations in 
creatures, since it shows that ‘the concept of relation as such … is not a fiction … but is 
something real, since in God it is something real.’ (Disputatio Metaphysica 47, 1, 11; Suarez, 
Disputationes, II, 784) 
 
The Methodological Background 
Medieval treatments of relations differ from twentieth and twenty-first century ones, at least 
in analytic philosophy, in one striking way. Since the time of Frege and Russell, most 
philosophers have agreed that relations are polyadic (many-placed) properties. Whereas a 
property such as whiteness is one-placed, because it can be represented by a one-place 
function (Wx) or expressed by a sentence with one blank space (‘--- is white’), ‘taller than’ is 
said to be a two-placed property, because it is represented by a two-place function (Txy) or 
expressed by a sentence with two blank spaces (‘--- is taller than---’). Almost all medieval 
theories of relations, however, as explained above, consider them to be accidents in a single 
subject – that is to say, in contemporary terms, as monadic properties. 4 Although medieval 
authors certainly acknowledge that a relation ‘looks to’ something else, it inheres in just one 
of the related things. 
When, nearly seventy years ago, A. Krempel wrote what remains the most detailed 
study of any single medieval author’s theory of relations (La doctrine de relation chez Saint 
Thomas), he seemed entirely unaware of such a difference. Although he says that he is not 
merely concerned to reconstruct the view of his chosen author, but with finding the truth, his 
range of reference remains within the scholastic tradition, with the occasional glance at Kant. 
Julius Weinberg’s approach, a decade later, could hardly have been more different. In his 
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view, the ancient and medieval understanding of relations is simply incorrect, because 
relations are taken (63) ‘as a special variety of accidents’. ‘The various substance ontologies 
of the past’, he believes (63), ‘have prevented or retarded an adequate theory of relations’, as 
‘a feature of facts which involves two terms taken together’ (119). But Weinberg’s overriding 
concern to see medieval theories in the light of contemporary approaches has not been widely 
followed. Schönberger, in the mid-1990s, is dimly aware of Russell’s views about relations 
and discussions in that tradition, but does not let them affect his approach. The encyclopaedic 
surveys in German and French stick firmly to the medieval conception of their topic.
5
 
This is not, as might be suspected, a division between Anglophone analytic 
approaches, and those of scholars trained in Continental Europe. Henninger, an American 
scholar, emphasizes and explains the ‘strangeness’ which ‘most find in medieval theories of 
relation’ at the very beginning of his study: - 
Today we might talk of one symmetrical relation R of colour similarity between two 
pieces of white chalk, a and b. But for the medieval, if there are two really distinct 
substances, there must be two really distinct accidents. (4) 
But in what follows he aims simply to set out the various medieval theories in their own 
terms. In this approach, he is following his teacher, Marilyn McCord Adams. She 
distinguishes and separates the contemporary from the medieval view, not without some 
tartness towards the former.
6
 The approach taken by Adams and Henninger has been that of 
most scholars, wherever trained, who have looked at one or another medieval philosopher’s 
theory of relations; so that it might be called the ‘Normal Historical Method’. Even writers 
such as Peter King, who are known for their analytic training and acumen evince them, like 
Adams and Henninger, by their clarity in presenting the different aspects of the medieval 
discussions rather than in making links or contrasts with contemporary debates.
7
  
Within the ambit of Normal Historical Method, however, writers may give more or 
less incidental attention to contemporary treatments of the theme they are studying. One 
example is Sten Ebbesen. He believes that ‘many of the problems the medieval incurred may 
be said to be due to their persistent attempts to squeeze polyadic predicates into moulds made 
for monadic ones’, but, as well as showing the links between medieval theories of 
signification and of relations, he brings to light a thirteenth-century discussion which, against 
the usual medieval grain, treats a binary relation as applying to a pair of objects, and not to 
each one singly.
8
 More recently, Heine Hansen has shown that Ebbesen’s suspicion that the 
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theory was not confined to a single text is well founded.
9
 Jeffrey Brower is aware of these 
discoveries, but he looks at the problem from a rather different angle. ‘Medieval 
philosophers’, he insists, 
approach the issue in the same basic way that contemporary philosophers do. Indeed, 
like us, they have a clear understanding of polyadic predicates, and they rely on them 
for their understanding of relations.
10
 
But, he explains, a few exceptional authors apart, no one in the period would accept that there 
can be polyadic properties to correspond to these terms. Whilst a minority reaction, as found 
in Peter Aureol, was to deny the reality of relations altogether, most thinkers accepted real 
relations, and either, reductively, identified them with monadic properties on which they are 
founded (for instance, Socrates’s being-six-foot-tall) or, non-reductively, characterized them 
as sui generis monadic properties. Following this line of thought, Sydney Penner (‘Why did 
Medieval Philosophers Reject Polyadic Accidents?’) has sought out and scrutinized the quite 
rare cases where medieval philosophers do not simply assume the rejection of polyadic 
accidents, but make arguments to justify it.
11
 
   
The Articles in this Special Issue 
 
The title of this special issue refers to medieval traditions. The plural is important, although it 
might perhaps be more accurate to speak of different branches of the same tradition. 
Medieval philosophy grows from late ancient thought, in different parallel and sometimes 
interconnected branches or traditions, within different cultures: the four most important are 
Greek (Byzantine) Philosophy, Latin Philosophy, Arabic Philosophy and Jewish Philosophy 
(in Arabic and Hebrew).
12
 Narrowness of vision – and the lack of philosophical scholars 
trained in Arabic and Hebrew – has led to an overwhelming emphasis on the Latin tradition 
among those writing about relations; the general accounts discussed above confine 
themselves almost entirely to it. The articles collected here do not achieve a balance, but they 
do at least include contributions on the Greek (Byzantine) and Arabic traditions. 
Christophe Erismann focuses on a particular way in which Aristotle’s discussions of 
relatives was put to use in the controversy over the worship of icons which split Byzantium in 
the eighth and ninth centuries. An image and its model are a pair of relatives, whereas, by 
contrast – as the Byzantine iconophiles wished to stress – an idol is not a relative, because it 
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has no real model to which it can be related. But there is an obvious problem. According to 
Aristotle, relatives must be ‘simultaneous by nature’: that is to say, if A and B are relatives, 
then A cannot exist if B does not exist, and B cannot exist if A does not exist. Most icons, 
however, depict figures who are now dead, even if in some cases they were alive when the 
icon was made. According to Erismann, one way round the difficulty, proposed by Theodore 
Studite, is to say that a figure – he gives Christ as his example – carries its own image with it 
in potency, and so Christ is never without his image, even before one has actually been 
produced as an artefact.
13
 A different solution was proposed by Patriarch Nicephorus, who 
argued that the relation itself (schesis) could survive even when the related things had 
perished. So, to follow Erismann’s reconstruction, suppose someone paints Gregory of Nyssa 
in his lifetime, then after Gregory has died, the icon ceases, because of the criterion of 
simultaneity, to be a relative to the model, Gregory, who no longer exists, but none the less 
the relation itself (of being-an-image) remains. This position is particularly interesting 
because, elsewhere in these discussions, the Byzantine thinkers stick closely to Aristotle’s 
text in the Categories, where he talks about related things, but not about relations. The idea of 
relations themselves is a Neoplatonic innovation. 
By giving readers a glimpse of how Byzantine thinkers put the analysis of relations to 
practical use, Erismann raises a wider curiosity about what theoretical accounts of them were 
developed. Unfortunately, there is no general account available, even a brief one, to let them 
take their interests further. The theory of relations in Arabic philosophy in general is not 
much better served. It is clear that in kalām, a type of specifically Islamic philosophical 
speculation which was influenced only indirectly by Aristotle, there were views about 
relations strikingly different from those in the Aristotelian tradition – in especial, the 
tendency to deny relations any reality at all.
14
 Little research has been done on this area, but 
the views of Avicenna, a critic of the kalām theory, have been subjected to analysis.15 
Avicenna’s discussion is close in some respects (and almost certainly influential on) those of 
the thirteenth-century Latin thinkers, such as Aquinas and Henry of Ghent who, regarding 
relations as monadic accidents, try to steer a middle course between taking them as things, 
and taking them as mental constructs.
16
 But Avicenna himself veers more towards 
considering relations themselves as purely conceptual. 
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Riccardo Strobino’s paper is on Avicenna, but it avoids the main themes in the 
metaphysics of relations which have been discussed by other scholars. Rather, Strobino 
concentrates on Avicenna’s evaluation of relatives when used in demonstrations. That 
evaluation is a low one. Some demonstrations, Avicenna believes, do not require a causal 
explanation why such and such is the case, because the major term belongs to the minor, not 
in virtue of cause, but simply in virtue of the minor term itself. Putative demonstrations 
involving relative terms might seem to be of this sort, since many relations are not causal, but 
knowledge of one of the terms of the relation immediately brings knowledge of the other: if 
someone is a sibling, it can be known immediately that he or she has a sibling. But Avicenna 
insists that such reasoning is in fact causal, though the causal explanation is hidden. For, as 
Strobino explains (n. 29), ‘the truth of ‘Zayd has a brother’ is not certain because of the truth 
of ‘Zayd is a brother’. What grounds the certainty is a third thing, like being generated by the 
same parent.’  
Latin Europe before the thirteenth century has been almost as neglected in general 
surveys of the theory of relations as the Byzantine and Arabic traditions.
17
 Nearly twenty 
years ago, however, Jeffrey Brower published a study of how the most famous twelfth-
century philosopher, Peter Abelard, conceived relations. Writing in terms heavily influenced 
by more recent and contemporary debates, Brower concluded that for Abelard ‘relations are 
internal and, for that very reason, reducible to monadic properties of related things’.18 In his 
chapter here, Christopher Martin gives a very different view of Abelard’s theory, which he 
scrupulously places in the context of Aristotle’s and Boethius’s discussions, 19  and his 
conclusions accord with a piece published at almost the same time by Christophe Erismann 
(which should be read together with it, since the two scholars converge in a complementary 
way, so that each article enriches the other).
20
 As a nominalist, it might be thought that 
Abelard would wish so far as possible to eliminate relations from his ontology, from 
considerations of parsimony. Far from it: at least in his logical works, from the earlier part of 
his career, he not only admits relations as particular forms (for instance, the being-a-father 
which inheres in John), but holds that, for each child, John has a separate particular form of 
being-a-father. Abelard’s view was not universally held at the time. Martin and Erismann 
also examine an anonymous commentary (existing in various forms) from roughly the same 
period, in which it is suggested that being-a-father is a universal accident, individuated only 
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by the subject in which it inheres, and so it does not make sense to say that John has more 
than one form of being-a-father, however numerous his progeny.
21
 
Two articles are on the period and setting which has dominated studies of the topic: 
the Latin universities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But, whereas most of the 
existing scholarship has been directed towards the theologians, such Aquinas, Henry of 
Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham, both pieces here are about Arts Masters. Heine Hansen 
focuses on texts, many of them unpublished, by earlier thirteenth-century Paris Arts Masters, 
who were working at the time when the full range of Aristotle’s texts was just becoming 
available – in particular, he looks at Robert Kilwardby, who became a master in Paris c. 
1237, and would later in life become a Dominican, a theologian and, finally, Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Hansen, as his title indicates, asks his readers to consider the example 
(Aristotle’s own, though not used by him about relations) of the road from Athens to Thebes. 
There is just one and the same road from Athens to Thebes, from Thebes to Athens and 
between Athens and Thebes. Thirteenth-century philosophers, as Hansen shows, considered 
the position (‘instance unicity’) that relations are like a road in this way. If Plato is similar to 
Socrates, then, like the road, there is just one relation (Plato’s similarity to 
Socrates/Socrates’s similarity to Plato/ the similarity between Plato and Socrates). Most of 
the philosophers, however, rejected the position, using various arguments based, especially, 
on the principle that accidents are individuated by substances and so, since the relation of 
similarity between Socrates and Plato regards two substances, there will be two particular 
accidents of similarity. These counter-arguments show how the Aristotelian subject-accident 
ontology tends to force medieval writers into accounts of relations strikingly different from 
contemporary ones, although – as Hansen deftly brings out – recent advocates of considering 
relations as being like the same road between two places fall into difficulties when it comes 
to asymmetric relations. Moreover, as Hansen’s own earlier work has already revealed, there 
were some thirteenth-century thinkers who argued that relations inhere in a single subject 
which is made of up of multiple things, and who, he explains, would thus have upheld 
instance unicity even where the relations are not symmetrical.
22
 
The subject of Aurélien Robert’s article, John of Jandun, was an Arts Master in Paris 
in the 1310s, who gained the reputation as a leading Averroist, although in fact in many areas 
of his thought, including his treatment of relations, he develops positions different from those 
of Averroes. John was a strong realist with regard to relations. As Schönberger, who provides 
a very useful survey of his theory as a whole, puts it: ‘Not only are there real relations in the 
sense of their not being dependent on thinking. They are also really distinct from their 
foundations.’23 Robert focuses on the question of relations and ‘mere Cambridge changes’. 
What ontological account should be given of a relation which something gains without itself 
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changing – as when Socrates, who is six-foot-tall and fully-grown, becomes equal in height 
to Plato, when Plato, who is still growing, reaches six foot? Aquinas was happy in such cases 
to consider that, whereas Plato acquires a real relation of equality in height to Socrates 
through the change which makes him, finally, six-foot-tall, the new relation of equality in 
height which Socrates thereby also acquires without any change is a mere relation of reason. 
John, however, held that relations of reason could hold only between things of reason – 
concepts – and so that Socrates’s newly acquired relation must be real. He removed the 
paradox of how Socrates could acquire a new accident of relation without any change by 
arguing that there is a change to him – precisely that of coming to be equal in height to Plato, 
but it is not the ordinary sort of continuous and divisible change, by which, for example, 
Plato has gradually turned from being a five-foot-tall boy to a six-foot man, but rather an 
instantaneous and indivisible change, such as takes place when the sun illuminates the air. 
Robert’s investigation into the ramifications of this position yields some important 
conclusions. Most interesting of all, Robert suggests that John ‘seems to defend what we 
would call nowadays a theory of property supervenience’ about moral virtues, sense 
perceptions and intellectual knowledge in respect of physical processes; and that the 
supervenience in question is strong: that is to say, there is a necessary relation between the 
supervening properties and the supervenience base.
24
 But, he adds, there are important 
differences from the contemporary notion of supervenience, since John thinks of the 
supervening properties as the ends and perfections of the physical processes on which they 
supervene, and that they involve the actualization of a natural potency already present in the 
subject. 
Although historians have tended to neglect fifteenth and early sixteenth-century 
university thought, much of it is highly sophisticated and some strikingly original. Paloma 
Pérez-Ilzarbe writes about Hieronymus Pardo, an Arts Master in the circle of John Major at 
Paris University, who died in 1505, before he could complete his theology degree. Pérez-
Ilzarbe studies what seems to be a merely incidental use of relations in semantic theory, but it 
is one which in fact raises some important ideas for the metaphysics of relations. From the 
time of Abelard onwards, philosophers discussed whether, just as categorematic words, such 
as ‘Socrates’, ‘running’, ‘white’ and ‘house’ in ‘Socrates is running to the white house’ each 
have things in the world which they signify, so the sentence as a whole needs a special object 
to signify. In the fourteenth century, opinion was divided between Buridan and his followers, 
who insisted that nothing more was required than the objects signified by the individual 
categorematic terms, and those who held that sentences as a whole signify complexe 
significabilia (complexly signifiable things). Complexe significabilia are considered to be sui 
generis entities, and their proponents often tried to making the ontologies they had so 
burdened seem less encumbered by reducing so far as possible the degree to which the 
complexe significabilia are entities at all. Pardo is a follower of Buridan, but one who thinks 
that sentences do need their own significates. He tries to fast along with parsimonious 
Buridan and yet eat his ontological cake by claiming that these significates are not things, but 
modes. They are how things are or, more precisely, how things are related to each other: ‘a 
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way of standing with respect to …’ Pérez-Ilzarbe argues that by using relations, Pardo 
introduces an ‘intensional’ point of view: a mode (which Pardo conceives as a relation) 
‘belongs to reality, without strictly being a component of the world’. Whatever the ultimate 
coherence of these metaphysical claims, Pardo’s theory has an important consequence which 
Pérez-Ilzarbe does not consider. Since what is signified by true sentences – that is to say, the 
facts of the world including all the statements of science – are relations, then these relations, 
although not considered to be things, are the very foundation of reality: they make the world 
what it is.  
The Logic of Relations 
From ‘A is equal to B’ and ‘B is equal to C’ it seems obviously to follow that A is equal to C. 
But this conclusion does not follow according to the laws of Aristotelian syllogistic; nor do 
these laws allow the inference that man is an animal, therefore the head of a man is the head 
of an animal.
25
 There have been logicians from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias who 
have tried to find a way of explaining such reasoning, but general histories of medieval logic 
leave relational syllogisms out of the picture.
26
 Yet, as was pointed out by Paul Thom nearly 
40 years ago, fourteenth-century logicians developed a theory of oblique syllogisms – those 
in which there is a term in a grammatical case other than the nominative. Many oblique 
syllogisms are what would now be called relational syllogisms. More recently, Terence 
Parsons has argued that medieval logic contained the resources to handle relational 
inferences.
27
 Meanwhile, specialized studies of logicians in the seventeenth century, such as 
Jungius (1587-1657) and Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606-82), have shown that they began to 
explore the logic of relations.
28
 Jungius finds a place for inferences such as ‘All circles are 
figures, therefore whoever draws a circle, draws a figure’, whilst Caramuel gave an original 
analysis of propositions in a relational syllogism. They have a special sort of complex copula, 
which specifies the relation: for example, ‘Ferdinand is a prince appreciated by the people’ 
has as its copula ‘is a prince appreciated by the people. Charles Manekin (The Logic of 
Gersonides) has pointed out the early fourteenth-century Jewish philosopher, Gersonides, 
explicitly developed a way of making relational inferences. And, in a remarkable book, 
Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900, Khaled el-Rouayheb has 
uncovered a whole tradition of sophisticated development of relational syllogistic in the 
Arabic tradition, especially in the eighteenth century and later. 
                                                 
25
 The second example is De Morgan’s (Formal Logic, 114; cited by Parsons, Articulating Medieval logic, 161). 
26
 The Kneales (The Development of Logic, 259) suggest in passing that Ockham and his contemporaries ‘had 
begun to work out some of the details … for the … theory of relations’, but do not elaborate. The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, despite its very full treatment of logic, mentions the logic of relations 
only once (796), as an example of an area where the medieval logicians failed; and there is nothing on the logic 
of relations in the current Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. In Haaparanta’s more recent collection 
on The Development of Modern Logic, similarly, the chapter on later medieval logic (by Mikko Yrjönsuuri) says 
nothing about the logic of relations. Only in the chapter on Caramuel are relations discussed in the medieval 
volume of Gabbay and Woods’s Handbook of the History of Logic. 
27
 Articulating Medieval Logic, 160-63. 
28
  See Ashworth ‘Joachim Jungius’ and Dvořák, ‘Relational Logic of Juan Caramuel’. 
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From these studies, it might seem that historians are starting to find that there were at 
least the beginnings of a logic of relations in the medieval Aristotelian tradition. Massimo 
Mugnai’s article is especially important, because it is the first explicit, general discussion of 
this topic. Mugnai’s conclusion, however, is negative. Taking up Thom’s investigation of the 
treatment of oblique terms by fourteenth-century logicians such as Ockham and Buridan, he 
argues that the relational syllogisms they propose are valid because of the laws which apply 
to other types of syllogisms too, rather than by virtue of the properties of the relations 
concerned. Mugnai is also sceptical about the success of the various seventeenth-century 
attempts to devise a logic of relations. He gives a special place to Caramuel, but finds his 
logica obliqua vague and lacking in systematic rigour. His comments add a valuable element 
of scepticism to the search for a medieval logic of relations, but they leave it open for the 
champions of Caramuel or the later Arab logicians to argue that his assessment is too harsh, 
and that these logicians in the medieval tradition may have succeeded in constructing a 
partial logic of relations even if they did not follow the path which would later be indicated 
by De Morgan. 
Mugnai also offers an explanation for why medieval thinkers did not go very far 
towards a logic of relations. He points to the characteristic feature of most medieval theories 
about the ontology of relations: the denial that one relation can exist in both of the related 
things – that there are ‘polyadic properties’. Had they acknowledged the existence, or even 
‘pragmatically, the usefulness’ of such properties, then it would have been much easier, so 
Mugnai contends, for them to develop a logic of relations. 
 
Some Suggestions for the Future 
This sketch of how relations in medieval philosophy have been discussed, and how they are 
addressed in the specialist articles collected here, suggests some conclusions which bear, not 
just on this topic, but more generally. They concern (1) the chronological and geographical 
range of medieval philosophy, (2) its relation to theology and (3) its relation to philosophical 
thinking today. 
(1) This collection aims especially to show how a single medieval tradition of treating 
relations is found in its various different branches (Greek, Latin and Arabic), and from the 
time of Boethius, at the turn of the sixth century, to late in the seventeenth. But a single 
volume can, on its own, do only a limited amount to right the bias towards Christian Latin 
thinkers of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries which is common throughout the 
subject and very strikingly evident in the case of this particular topic. Those looking for a 
general orientation will find themselves directed towards a small and fairly homogeneous 
group of thinkers – Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, Peter Aureol, 
William of Ockham: all of them theologians at Paris or Oxford in the hundred years from 
1250. Even outliers within the broad Latin later medieval tradition (non-theologians, those 
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outside the universities) are hardly mentioned, and the Greek, Arabic and Jewish traditions 
even less.
29
 As a result, we should admit that, at the moment, we know too little to form any 
definite conclusions about medieval thought on relations, and we should be willing to shift 
the emphasis of research away from the one patch within this wide field that is relatively well 
studied to the mass of texts from many centuries and in various languages which have not yet 
been examined in connections with this topic.  
(2) There is another, completely different aspect of the breadth of medieval discussion 
about relations (and most other concepts). Relations were not merely a philosophical, but also 
a theological topic. Indeed, as will already be clear, in the Latin tradition most of the theories 
that have been investigated were the work of theologians. The links between theories of 
relations and theology are not, however, much evident in the essays here (except for 
Erismann’s piece on the controversy over icons in Byzantium). Nor indeed are they to the 
forefront in the wider literature: although the central authors treated are usually theologians, 
their views about relations tend to be treated as if they were purely philosophical. The 
implications of Aristotelian ontology are freely acknowledged, but those of Christian (or 
Jewish, or Muslim) doctrine tend to be ignored. Yet both contributed to shaping the medieval 
debate and, if they constrained it in ways some might find regrettable, in other ways they 
added to its richness.  
The theological element becomes particularly fascinating if it is studied in the light of 
all the four major branches of the tradition from a comparative perspective – something that 
has not yet been done.  As already mentioned, Jews, Christians and Muslims all needed to 
explain how creatures could be related to God, without positing any changing accidents of 
relation in the immutable divinity. But Christians, unlike Jews and Muslims, also believed 
that God, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is himself relational, and so, however much they 
followed Aristotelian ontology, they could not accept that relation is in all cases a type of 
accident. How did what their religious doctrines had in common, and where they differed, 
affect the ways in which thinkers of different faiths developed, distorted or, to some extent, 
emancipated themselves from the Aristotelian heritage? 
(3)  The articles here, as already noted, follow the Standard Historical Method. Some 
of the writers choose simply to explain the medieval texts just in their own terms, but others 
include incidental or more extensive (Hansen) comparison with contemporary discussions, or 
implicitly take their starting point from them (Mugnai). Although none of them uses today’s 
theories as an explicit measure of how earlier views went wrong, in the way Weinberg did, 
they treat them as setting a norm, from which the medieval theories are deviations. For 
example, Robert refers to the notion of supervenience, but points out various ways in which 
John of Jandun’s assumptions differ from those of philosophers who use this idea today. And 
most of the writers regard the usual contemporary view that relations are polyadic properties 
as clear and obvious, and the medieval view that they are monadic as in need of explanation. 
                                                 
29
 Two important outliers, who arguable give more attention to relations than most medieval philosophers, are 
Ramon Llull (cf. Flasch, Das philosophische Denken, 446-47) and Nicholas of Cusa (see Kampits, ‘Substanz 
und Relation bei Nicolaus Cusanus’). 
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In many cases, however, the contemporary views are no more clear and obvious, and 
no less contestable, than the medieval ones. For example, both the definition of 
supervenience and its explanatory value are now debated. With regard to polyadic properties, 
it is open to ask whether this notion is an informative one. The terms ‘monadic’ and 
‘polyadic’ apply literally to expressions in language. If their use to describe properties is 
merely metonymous, so that a polyadic property is just the sort of property signified by a 
polyadic expression, then relations will be polyadic according to the standard Aristotelian and 
medieval theory, since it recognized that relations are signified by multi-place expressions 
(for instance, ‘---is the father ---’). And, if properties are held literally to be polyadic, what 
can this mean? How can an abstract entity have two or more places or slots? To answer that 
for a property to be polyadic means that it relates two or more things would be merely to 
explain what relations are by saying that they are relations.  It is indeed true that arguments 
have been brought forward, for instance by Bertrand Russell, against the coherence of a 
theory of relations founded on ordinary (monadic) accidents. But counter-arguments can, and 
have, been proposed; the Aristotelian outlook on relations remains defensible.
30
 
This comment should not be taken to imply that the main value for investigation into 
medieval (or other historical) treatments of a topic such as relations lies in how it can help 
contemporary philosophical discussion. On the contrary, its point is to suggest how historians 
of philosophy can best make use of contemporary debates for their own historical ends. 
Where contemporary philosophy is treated too reverentially, as a fixed body of doctrine that 
sets up a standard against which earlier philosophers must be judged, it may indeed have the 
value of making strange assumptions that specialists’ immersion in their chosen period have 
rendered, on a superficial level, too familiar. But it is only when the historians come to 
engage with today’s discussions as philosophy — as arguments and ideas open to attack and 
refutation — that they can use them to help engage with the historical texts as philosophy too, 
and so strive to make familiar what, on a deeper level, remains strange about them even to the 
consummate specialist.
31
 
 
 
John Marenbon 
  
                                                 
30
 See Anna Marmodoro’s comments in the Introduction to The Metaphysics of Relations (3-7). For Russell’s 
criticisms, see The Philosophy of Mathematics I, 221-26 (sections 212-16) and cf. Candlish, The 
Russell/Bradley Dispute, especially chapter 6. 
31
 Novalis’s idea of making the strange familiar and vice versa was used by Bernard Williams (‘Descartes and 
Historiography’, 259), but – conversely to what I suggest here - as a way of explaining the value of history of 
philosophy to contemporary philosophy.  I am grateful to Mike Beaney, Christophe Erismann, Tony Street, 
Riccardo Strobino and Sophia Vasalou for bibliographical help with this Introduction, and to Anna Marmodoro 
for reading it through before publication.  
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